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The Canterbury earthquake sequence sparked a series of 
constitutional seismic shifts whose after-effects look set to 
continue long after Christchurch’s regeneration is complete.1 
At the heart of the Canterbury earthquake legislation2 was a 
Henry VIII clause that gave the executive the power to modify 
almost all primary legislation for a broad range of purposes 
related to recovery. The Henry VIII clause was supported 
by privative clauses shielding government decisions from 
judicial review. 
While the Henry VIII clause caused 
some concern, the executive’s use of it was 
both proportionate and restrained (Kerkin, 
2017, p.164). It is, therefore, unsurprising 
that the executive turned to it in responding 
to the Hurunui/Kaiköura earthquakes. 
The Hurunui/Kaiköura Earthquakes 
Recovery Act 2016 (the Kaiköura Act) 
contains a Henry VIII clause modelled on 
the Canterbury legislation, with some 
important differences. The Kaiköura Act 
strengthens, and imposes some new, 
safeguards on the Henry VIII clause. But it 
struggles with the same constitutional 
challenges as the Canterbury legislation. 
Further development is desirable in this 
constitutional evolution.3 
What’s the issue with Henry VIII clauses?
Henry VIII clauses empower the executive 
to modify acts of Parliament using delegated 
legislation (law made by the executive using 
powers delegated by Parliament). This 
transfer of power from the legislature to 
the executive has traditionally been treated 
with suspicion as possibly constitutionally 
inappropriate (McGee, 2017, p.465). As 
a general rule, only Parliament should 
amend law that it has made. 
This general rule separates Parliament’s 
and the executive’s functions and, by so 
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doing, supports the rule of law (Waldron, 
2012). It reflects Parliament’s authority to 
make the law, which comes from its 
sovereignty and from its constituent 
members, who are the people’s elected 
representatives (Geddis and Fenton, 2008). 
Parliament should make law, particularly 
where it affects human rights, property 
interests, access to justice or expenditure of 
public money (Legislation Advisory 
Committee, 2014, ch.13.1). 
Yet there can be a place for Henry VIII 
clauses in the modern legislative toolkit. 
New Zealand’s recent legislative history 
suggests they have found a place in the 
context of disaster recovery. 
Why use a Henry VIII clause for disaster 
recovery?
The Canterbury legislation’s Henry VIII 
clause was intended to put the legal 
authority for recovery activities beyond 
doubt.4 There were both pragmatic 
and principled reasons for doing so. 
Pragmatically, recovery would have been 
slowed if people hesitated to act for fear 
of breaching the law or delayed acting 
until they had obtained legal advice or 
an indemnity. The principled reasons 
related to questions of fairness and 
legitimacy. It would have been unfair to 
hold people liable for contravening laws 
made in ‘peacetime’ that could not be 
complied with, or no longer quite made 
sense, in the post-earthquake context 
(Nick Smith in Hansard, 2010). It was 
more consistent with the rule of law to 
ensure that the law made sense and could 
be complied with. 
Ideally the method of changing the law 
would uphold the law’s legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is a core tenet of a constitutional 
framework, and is necessary for public 
acceptance of, and compliance with, the 
law. Public confidence in the legitimacy of 
lawmaking enhances acceptance of the law 
and shores up legitimacy of the 
underpinning constitutional settings. 
The Canterbury legislation’s Henry 
VIII clause caused some consternation, 
partly due to its breadth and partly because 
there were few constraints on the use of 
that power. On paper the clause ran 
lawmaking, implementation and coercive 
action into Waldron’s single gestalt 
(Waldron, 2013) centred on the executive. 
In practice, the executive’s lawmaking 
power was exercised with restraint. The 
Regulations Review Committee’s scrutiny 
did not identify any significant unresolved 
concerns (Regulations Review Committee, 
2010, 2011). Only once was the validity of an 
order made under the Henry VIII clause 
called into question, due to an irregularity 
in the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Review Panel’s make-up. Even here, the 
Regulations Review Committee did not 
conclude that the order was invalid, although 
it suggested validating legislation just in case 
(Regulations Review Committee, 2015).
While the Henry VIII clause did raise 
some constitutional concerns, it also 
resonated with the New Zealand 
constitutional value of pragmatism (Kerkin, 
2017, p.284). There is a paradox at the heart 
of the parliamentary lawmaking process. In 
an unwritten constitution, procedure is 
important, and often is the protection: 
‘without good process, good law is much 
more difficult to achieve’ (McLeay, Geiringer 
and Higbee, 2012, p.14). In the right 
circumstances these procedural protections 
can undermine public confidence if they are 
too cumbersome, too slow, or a 
disproportionate investment for the matter 
at hand. Here, they may weaken trust and 
confidence in the lawmaking procedure, the 
executive and Parliament (Kerkin, 2017, pp. 
272, 283-5). In the right circumstances and 
with the right safeguards, a Henry VIII 
clause might carry more legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public than more traditional 
ways of legislating.
The Kaiko-ura clause has evolved from 
experience in Canterbury
The Kaiköura clause takes a more deliberate 
approach to constitutional safeguards, so 
that executive restraint is not completely 
left to chance.
It has a narrower application than the 
Canterbury clause
The Canterbury clause (s71) allowed all 
but six core constitutional statutes5 to be 
amended by order in council. It was first 
enacted in the 2010 act. 
The 2010 act was passed just 10 days 
after the initial earthquake. Officials 
invited Canterbury local authorities ‘to 
compile a “wish list” of the legislative 
changes that they may require to promote 
a more efficient recovery’ (Gall, 2012, 
p.234). This line of questioning invited a 
focus on matters of bureaucratic 
inconvenience rather than a methodical 
assessment of business needs. It resulted in 
an unfocused and abstract response (ibid.) 
that was unlikely to have instilled 
confidence that the local authorities knew 
precisely which legal barriers they faced. In 
light of that, the executive considered the 
only practical way forward was to enact a 
generic Henry VIII clause (Gall, 2012; 
Gerry Brownlee in Hansard, 2010). 
By 2011 agencies had a clearer idea of 
what activities would be needed, and the 
kinds of legal constraints in play. 
Parliament heard submissions suggesting 
that other core constitutional statutes be 
removed from the Henry VIII clause’s 
ambit as a signal about constitutional no-
go areas. On a practical note, Orion Energy 
Ltd (the electricity supplier to much of 
Christchurch) suggested adding statutes to 
the list of those expressly subject to the 
clause to improve certainty and limit the 
need to rely on ministerial discretion 
(Local Government and Environment 
Committee, 2011, pp.101-2). The 
government of the day rejected these 
submissions and the 2010 Henry VIII 
clause was carried through unchanged into 
the 2011 act. 
By contrast, the Kaiköura clause 
(Kaiköura Act, s7) permits only those 
Parliament heard submissions 
suggesting that other core constitutional 
statutes be removed from the Henry 
VIII clause’s ambit as a signal about 
constitutional no-go areas.
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statutes listed in Schedule 2 to be modified. 
Schedule 2 statutes mostly relate to land 
and buildings, conservation, environment 
and marine legislation, civil defence and 
earthquakes, revenue, local government, 
transport and food safety. 
The act preserves flexibility for the 
executive. Schedule 2 can itself be expanded 
by order in council. The minister6 may seek 
to extend Schedule 2 if satisfied that it is 
necessary or desirable for the purposes of 
the act, and the order would not breach 
specified exclusions from the regime. The 
minister must give a draft of the order and 
the minister’s reasons to each leader of the 
political parties represented in Parliament. 
The order can be made only if there is 
unanimous or near unanimous support 
for the order from those leaders. This 
approach seeks Parliament’s imprimatur in 
a less formal way than more traditional 
procedures such as affirmative resolution, 
while achieving a substantially similar 
result. Any order extending Schedule 2 can 
be revoked if not approved by the House 
(s19). 
No ‘expedient’ amendments 
Parliament’s Regulations Review 
Committee has traditionally taken the 
view that Henry VIII clauses should be 
avoided unless demonstrably essential, 
and has recommended they be used only in 
exceptional circumstances (McGee, 2017, 
p.465). 
Section 71 of the 2011 act allowed 
orders in council to ‘make any provision 
that is reasonably necessary or expedient’ 
for the act’s purposes, which were 
themselves drawn quite widely. The term 
‘expedient’ is not often used in delegating 
Parliament’s power to legislate, and no 
explanation was given for it. The minister’s 
examples to the House of where the 
lawmaking power was to be used were at 
the ‘necessary’ end of the spectrum, such 
as allowing heavier than allowable loads to 
be taken to landfills and streamlining 
processes for dealing with dangerous 
buildings (Gerry Brownlee in Hansard, 
2010).
The use of ‘expedient’ was particularly 
troubling for some. For instance, the 
Legislation Advisory Committee submitted 
that: 
the words ‘or expedient’ just shouldn’t 
be there. It should be limited to things 
that are extraordinary and need to be 
done because they’re absolutely 
necessary to give effect to the purpose 
of the Act, not things that are simply 
expedient to do. (Local Government 
and Environment Committee, 2011, 
p.31)
By contrast, the Kaiköura Act does not 
use ‘expedient’. It allows orders to be made 
where ‘necessary or desirable’ for the 
purpose of the act. For practical purposes, 
the difference may be semantic, but the 
language of desirability seems more 
positive than that of expedience. However, 
the inclusion of ‘desirable’ means that the 
Kaiköura Act still strays from the ideal of 
‘demonstrably essential’. 
Enhanced transparency and accountability 
through reasons
A requirement to give reasons aids 
the transparency of decision making 
under the act. Transparency promotes 
legitimacy in two ways. First, it promotes 
understanding of why certain decisions 
have been made. Understanding 
promotes acceptance: people are more 
likely to accept a decision, even if they 
disagree with it, if they understand 
why the decision maker has made it. 
Second, transparency is a precursor to 
accountability: a transparent decision-
making power gives people the means to 
hold decision makers to account.
The Canterbury legislation did not 
contain any requirements to give reasons 
for using the Henry VIII clause. The 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Review 
Panel (the Canterbury Panel), which 
advised the minister on draft orders, 
tended not to give reasons for its decisions. 
By giving reasons the Canterbury Panel 
could have created a body of decision-
making jurisprudence, which would have 
helped departments learn from the 
experiences of others and informed the 
public about the acceptable tolerances 
within which the Henry VIII clause could 
be used (Kerkin, 2017, p.164).
Section 88 of the 2011 act required the 
minister to report quarterly to Parliament 
on his use of powers under the act. As 
enacted, section 88 did not require reasons 
to be given or details to be specified, and 
the minister’s section 88 reports did not 
give any (Kerkin, 2017, pp.187-8; Minister 
for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, 
2011).
By contrast, the Kaiköura Act includes 
reasons requirements. The minister must 
give reasons for recommending an order 
in council under section 7, including why 
the order is appropriate (s10). The 
Hurunui/Kaiköura Earthquakes Recovery 
Review Panel (the Kaiköura Panel), which 
reviews draft orders in council made under 
section 7, must give reasons for its 
recommendations (s14(6)). Finally, any 
proposals to amend Schedule 2 must also 
be accompanied by reasons (s20). 
These reasons requirements mean 
that the minister and the Kaiköura Panel 
will have to justify their decisions. 
Committing those reasons to paper means 
thought will be given to their defensibility. 
In this way, reasons requirements provide 
political accountability that will be felt 
immediately. While not formal legal 
accountability, the introduction of 
reasons requirements in the Kaiköura Act 
is a safeguard that can systematically 
encourage reasonable and restrained use 
of the Henry VIII clause. 
While not formal legal accountability, the 
introduction of reasons requirements in 
the Kaiko-ura Act is a safeguard that can 
systematically encourage reasonable and 
restrained use of the Henry VIII clause.
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Enhanced legitimacy through engagement 
Participation in decision-making 
procedures enhances legitimacy in several 
ways. It gives people an opportunity to 
influence and inform decision makers, and 
helps them to understand the decision. It 
can help decision makers to ensure they 
have the right information, are aware of 
all relevant perspectives, and can anticipate 
the decision’s consequences.
The Canterbury legislation was 
influenced by an assumption that public 
and parliamentary participation is time-
consuming and could impede a timely 
recovery. The purpose clause (s3) made 
that clear: the act was to enable a focused, 
timely and expedited recovery and enabled 
community participation only to the 
extent that it did not impede that. 
By contrast, the Kaiköura Act 
strengthens engagement expectations. 
First, it strengthens parliamentary 
engagement by requiring the minister to 
engage with the Regulations Review 
Committee or, if the House is adjourned, 
with the leaders of parliamentary parties, 
on draft orders (s8(1)(c) and (d)). That 
early engagement should promote 
legitimacy and reduce the potential for 
disallowance.
Second, it broadens the perspectives 
brought into the order in council process 
through membership of the Kaiköura 
Panel. The panels established under the 
Canterbury and Kaiköura acts were 
intended to inject rigour into the process 
through their expertise and independent 
advice. The Canterbury Panel had four 
members with relevant expertise or 
appropriate skills, and the chair was to be 
a former or retired judge of the High Court 
or a lawyer (s72(1)). By contrast, the 
Kaiköura Panel may have up to six 
members, who must possess relevant skills 
in one or more of:
· law, public administration or local 
government;
· mätauranga Mäori (Mäori traditional 
knowledge) and tikanga Mäori 
(Mäori protocol and culture);
· environmental protection;
· the nature of the affected 
communities and the earthquake-
affected area. (s12)
In appointing members, the minister 
must have regard to the views of Local 
Government New Zealand and one or 
more organisations or representatives 
who have knowledge, skills or experience 
relating to mätauranga Mäori and tikanga 
Mäori in the earthquake-affected area. 
Most significantly, the Kaiköura Act 
requires that in developing orders in 
council, the relevant portfolio ministers 
must identify people who ought to be 
consulted. There is a procedure – albeit 
highly truncated – for ministers to follow. 
If ministers consider engagement is 
impracticable, they must publish their 
reasons for not following the engagement 
procedure with the order (s9). Committing 
those reasons to paper should ensure 
ministers consider the defensibility of their 
preferred approach.
The ongoing constitutional challenges
While the Kaiköura Act has evolved 
from the Canterbury legislation, there 
are still some outstanding constitutional 
challenges.
A broad purpose
Purpose is relevant to disallowance (the 
process by which Parliament supervises and 
controls delegated legislation). Parliament 
may disallow delegated legislation that 
makes an ‘unusual or unexpected’ use of 
the lawmaking power (standing order 319). 
That ground for review will be undermined 
if the empowering act’s purpose clause 
is all-encompassing: the wider the act’s 
purpose, the less likely an instrument 
is to stray beyond it. Thus, disallowance 
may not be an effective remedy against 
executive overreach. 
While some were uncomfortable with 
the breadth of the 2011 act’s purposes, the 
government maintained that the purpose 
was clearly defined (Kerkin, 2017, pp.161-
3). And the question did not arise in orders 
made under the Canterbury legislation, 
due to careful use by the executive (Kerkin, 
2017, p.133). 
In debating the Kaiköura Act, then 
shadow attorney-general spokesperson 
David Parker noted that the powers in the 
Canterbury legislation ‘were not abused, 
but the possibility of their abuse existed 
from the breadth of the legislation’ 
(Hansard, 2016a, p.15467). Some 
submitters on the Kaiköura Act considered 
the purposes to be too broad (Geddis and 
Knight, 2016; Hopkins, 2016a).  
There may not be an easy way around 
this problem. Both acts take a holistic view 
of recovery, viewing it in terms of 
environmental, social, economic and 
cultural well-being (2011 act, s3; Kaiköura 
Act, s3). In the Kaiköura Act, the holistic 
approach to recovery tends to be 
compounded by the act’s coverage of 
greater Wellington (which extends to the 
Wairarapa), where a state of emergency 
was never declared. 
A broad purpose does not sit easily 
with the ideal of the use of Henry VIII 
clauses only where ‘demonstrably essential’. 
This tension is likely to be felt in any future 
disaster recovery statute that uses a Henry 
VIII clause.
Continued discomfort with inroads into 
parliamentary supremacy
There is a continuing unease with the use 
of Henry VIII clauses in relation to disaster 
recovery. In part that unease may come 
from the fact that not all recovery decisions 
are equally urgent. In the early days of 
recovery, urgent amendments may be 
needed to get people into safe, weathertight 
accommodation, to open access to the 
affected area, and to ensure that businesses 
do not fail due to disruption. But longer-
lasting decisions about the rebuilt 
[The Kaiko-ura Act] also seeks to find a 
better balance between the executive 
and legislative branches, to mitigate the 
centralisation of power in the executive 
created by the Henry VIII clause.
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environment may lack legitimacy if made 
without engagement with the affected 
communities. Disaster recovery ‘is a slow 
and long-term process riven with choices 
that raise difficult questions. To put this 
simply, disaster recovery is about policy’ 
(Hopkins, 2016b, p.201). 
As a remedy, it has been proposed that 
all orders made under the Henry VIII 
clause should be subject to affirmative 
resolution by Parliament that would 
validate the measure (Geddis and Knight, 
2016; Hansard, 2016b, p.15735). That 
approach would mean the orders would 
not come into force until affirmed by 
Parliament (McGee, 2017, p.474), which 
could significantly delay their 
commencement depending on when they 
were made and whether the House was 
sitting at the time. For some orders that 
might not matter; for others, it might be 
critical.
A more nuanced approach is probably 
needed. Ideally, the Henry VIII clause 
would be reserved for those situations 
where the parliamentary process is too 
slow and where waiting for that process 
risks undermining public confidence in the 
lawmaking process. The Kaiköura Act’s 
engagement clause (s9) may provide 
ministers and officials with an informal 
rule of thumb: if the context warrants – 
and allows for – a full engagement process, 
consideration might be given to making 
amendments by primary legislation, not by 
order in council. At the same time, a full 
engagement process might largely mitigate 
the harm done by using the Henry VIII 
mechanism in terms of decision quality 
and legitimacy.
Privative clauses remain a constitutional 
irritant
The Canterbury legislation contained two 
privative clauses, which were viewed as 
inflammatory, and experts were divided 
over whether they would be effective 
(Kerkin, 2017, p.160). 
The privative clauses were carried over 
into the Kaiköura Act, and much the same 
concerns were raised again. While the act 
clarifies that there is a residual judicial 
review right, it is not as wide as some 
members would have liked. David Parker 
observed:
But I, personally, think we should not 
be at all limiting judicial review 
rights. The bill does limit judicial 
review rights around process 
decisions and other decisions that the 
Minister takes under the Act. I do not 
think that was necessary. There is 
already a very wide discretion for the 
Minister. The test of his decision 
making is a subjective one – it is not 
an objective one – which gives him 
great latitude, and I do not think we 
should be scared of the courts having 
a judicial review function. (Hansard, 
2016b, p.15733)
Conclusion
Henry VIII clauses are likely to be a long-
term feature of the disaster recovery 
landscape. Where legislative change is 
needed urgently, parliamentary processes 
can be too slow and inefficient. Reliance 
on Parliament would have opportunity 
costs, in terms of the time needed both for 
a bill’s passage and for the other legislation 
it displaces on the order paper. It may, 
paradoxically, weaken public confidence 
that the executive and legislature can 
act decisively and pragmatically in the 
face of disaster. Although they present 
some constitutional challenges, Henry 
VIII clauses are a pragmatic approach to 
making precise amendments to statutes in 
post-disaster recovery contexts. 
The Kaiköura Act shows how Henry 
VIII clauses can evolve to make use of in-
formal safeguards against disproportion-
ate or arbitrary use. It seeks to ensure that 
ministers’ decisions are informed by wider 
perspectives, and that a broader 
parliamentary consensus is reached where 
possible. This promotes good decision 
making by ensuring that ministers are 
aware of all relevant considerations before 
making a decision. It also seeks to find a 
better balance between the executive and 
legislative branches, to mitigate the 
centralisation of power in the executive 
created by the Henry VIII clause.
The new safeguards in the Kaiköura Act 
are a step in the right direction. They 
reduce the ‘possibility of abuse’, although 
the levers are more informal and incentive-
based than some would like. Challenges 
remain to ensure that disaster recovery 
Henry VIII clauses have a clearly defined 
and proportionate scope and that their use 
is properly controlled and supervised by 
Parliament and the judiciary. 
1 This article contains the author’s personal views and does 
not represent government policy or the position of the 
Ministry of Justice. 
2 Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 2010, 
which was repealed and replaced by the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Act 2011. The Henry VIII clause in the 
2010 act was carried through without change.
3 That evolution is continuing apace, with the introduction 
to Parliament on 4 December 2017 of the Christ Church 
Cathedral Reinstatement Bill, which contains a Henry 
VIII clause to facilitate reinstatement of the cathedral. An 
addendum to this article considering the effect of this bill will 
be included in the next issue of Policy Quarterly.
4 This is implicit in the general policy statement on the 
Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Bill 2010: 
www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2010/0215/latest/
DLM3233004.html. 
5 The Bill of Rights 1688, Constitution Act 1986, Electoral Act 
1993, Judicature Amendment Act 1972, New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 and Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.
6 In this article ‘the minister’ means the minister with 
delegated responsibility for earthquake recovery. 
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